History and Origin of the Cold War

135). American determination was beef up by its monopoly over its new found atomic weapons turn its resolve was weakened by demobilization of its armed forces which declined in Europe from eight million in April 1945 to 400,000 a course of study later (Thomas, 1987, p. 145).

During the winter of 1945-1946 and the spring of 1946, the Soviet Union do a number of moves which were understood in the western to be tests of its resolve. First came the Soviet failure to remove its forces from northern Iran as agreed at the Tehran Conference in 1943 and efforts to aid revolution in the Persian province of Azerbaijan. On this issue, the views of to a greater extent hawkish advisers to President Truman such as Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and secretarial assistant of the Navy James Forrestal prevailed. After Acheson sent the Soviets a corpse note and the Iranians complained to the United Nations Security Council, the Soviets withdrew their forces. The crisis was over by may 1946.

In February 1946 Josef Stalin delivered what most observers regarded as a truculent and anti-Western speech. George Kennan followed this up with his long telegram to the State Department in which he commented on "the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs," its moribund fears and suspicions of the West and its need for an external enemy to justify dictatorship at home (Chace, 1998, pp. 149-150, Kennan, 1947, July, pp. 566-582). Kennan called for long term containment by t

Diplomatic relations between the United States and the Russian Empire were first established in 1809. The first American ambassador to St. Petersburg was John Quincy Adams, later President, who was on such advise terms with Tsar Alexander I that the latter confided to Adams his fears of short sleep Bonaparte during their frequent walks together. Relations between the two countries had broadly been cordial if somewhat remote since Revolutionary War time and remained so during most of the rest of the 19th century. Daniels says that "of all the nations that jockeyed for tycoon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, none of any logical implication had less in common or fewer points of fulfil than the United States of America and the Empire of St. Petersburg" (1985, p. 66).

3.

National and International Power

In retrospect it appears that Kennan was correct. The USSR under Stalin needed an external enemy to justify its monstrous regime. The West had no choice but to elude its expansion.

Aggressive ultranationalism nevertheless is a threat to peace. As Ebenstein puts it,

After the turn of the century, the American government under its diffuse Door Policy opposed the dismemberment of mainland China by or disproportionate ascertain of any foreign precedent there. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Russia was seen as the primary threat to China to be replaced later by the Japanese. President Theodore Roosevelt mediated a settlement of that war which effectively reduced Russian influence in Manchuria. Even though TR's efforts were criticized in both St. Petersburg and Tokyo, he merely ratified what the Tsar's decrepit multitude forces lost on the battlefield.

Economic factors, as measured by a nation's sodding(a) national product, per capita income and productivity, are important indicators of its military and economic strength. These factors are inter-related. As Kennedy says, "wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually n
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