Mediterranean Empire to Continental Western Europe - A Transformation

The resulting conquest was very practically the exception in roman history, and had it not taken place, it is merely plausible, even probable, that later roman types would have been content to establish single a defensive limes in southern Gaul to nurture their existing province along the Mediterranean coast.

Caesar adapted long- realised papist policy toward relationships with assort to provide justification and lever age for the amplification of roman type power across Gaul. Attacks on romish allies were used as pretext for the subjection of those allies' neighbors. Likewise, the rise of anti- papistical factions inside allied tribes was used to justify the forcible re-imposition of pro-Roman leaders, under conditions that ever streng whereforeed the Roman hold on these tribes. The initial score of war was the mean mass migration of the Helvetii, a scheme which gibe to Caesar was originally contrived by an ambitious chieftain named Orgetorix, merely which the Helvetii continued to pursue even after Orgetorix's fall and death. The intended line of march would pass through the existing Roman Province, and intervention was thus well within even a narrow interpretation of Caesar's responsibilities.

However, the intentions of the Helvetii also involved them in struggle with the Aedui, a tribe friendly to capital of Italy. Caesar chose to expand his brief to incl

ude defense of the Aedui. This decision was reasonable enough, however in moving the zone of action outside of Roman territory it was the first step in the expansion of the war. As Caesar demanded that the Aedui follow through on their committments undertaken as an ally, that tribe drop into immanent disputes, which in turn allowed Caesar to involve himself in Aedui internal affairs.

Thus, in this break phase of the war, and in the successive campaigns that followed, established Roman strategies for political expansion were put into play: first, committing Rome to the defense of an ally, then intervening in the ally's domestic regime to bind it more closely to Rome.

Caesar had everything to do at once--hoist the fleur-de-lys which was the signal for running to arms, recall the men from their work on the camp, fetch back those who had

Caesar's strategic procedure of innovation base on precedent was mirrored on the military level. The Roman army was in modern terms an army assemble for " stuffy" war against centralized enemy powers fielding conventional armies of their own. It is true that on the tactical level the hallmark of the Roman legion was its flexibility in maneuver; this feature is what princely it from the Macedonian-type phalanx that was its most frequent enemy in the age of Roman expansion.

Thus, when under surprise attack by the Nervii, Roman standard operating procedure took care of the critical opening phase of the action. Caesar had only to give a handful of orders, and then take on the morale-building role of showing himself to the front ranks of the close unit (the 10th Legion). Shortly thereafter, Caesar did have to step personally into a breach to prevent a possible rout. moving on to the 12th Legion, he found it hard-pressed:

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